The things an aggressor routinely does in a war, turning off the water, the gas, electricity, internet, especially the internet, the Russians didn’t do any of these. I think because they don't want to make the lives of civilians impossible. It seems to me, they are trying to spare them as much as possible.

Tamas Lanczi, digital director, MTVA, 2022/04/09

I understand that the it’s in the US’s geopolitical interest to destabilize countries in the region, to drive a wedge between the V4 [countries], to make Hungary a pariah again, to silently pick apart from what's left of the intentionally crushed and weakened European Union, especially the patriotic nation-states. I understand everything. I understand why they want to turn off the Russian gas. Because the “selfless” US could immediately start selling their liquefied natural gas - magnitudes more expensive - sending tankers across the ocean, cost what it cost for the mislead Europeans

Philip Rákay, member of the Megafon-group, 2022.03.25. 

At first glance, these do not sound like the government-sponsored narratives of an EU and NATO member state, yet in Hungary, the above is not even considered an extreme view.

Even before the war, Hungary had one of the most difficult media environments in the EU. Government interference in the advertising market, years of media capture and the subsequent construction of a centralized propaganda machine, coupled with SLAPPs and other forms of pressure meant PM Viktor Orban had firm control over much of the public discourse and the information space in Hungary.

PM Orban has spent a considerable amount of political capital over the past 12 years trying to persuade Hungarians that Russian president Vladimir Putin is not just a reliable partner but an important international ally, so when Russia invaded Ukraine during the final months of the Hungarian national election campaign, the government found itself in a difficult position.

Hungary relies heavily on Russian energy exports, especially gas, and deals with the Kremlin are portrayed as key for keeping the prices of household utilities relatively low. Russia is also supposed to build a new nuclear power station in the town of Paks in central Hungary, a project that is considered critical by the government.

If the government was to keep these deals alive, Hungary had to try to stay neutral, and on the best possible terms with the Kremlin. But neutrality is a tough sell even for domestic audiences in the face of Russian atrocities, so the Hungarian government’s propaganda machine started spreading misleading or false narratives diminishing or outright denying Russia’s responsibility for the invasion, implicitly - and, in some cases, explicitly -  blaming the US for the conflict. 

While some journalists and certain small NGOs did important fact-checking work from time to time, there were no systemic efforts by mainstream outlets debunking misleading or false narratives and routinely fact-checking statements by politicians until we launched lakmusz.hu (“lakmusz” is litmus in Hungarian) in January 2022.

Lakmusz is a dedicated fact-checking newsroom, part of the Hungarian Digital Media Observatory, a joint project by the French international news agency AFP, Magyar Jeti Zrt, the publisher of the popular news portal 444.hu and science-focused qubit.hu, and media researchers from ELTE university. The initiative is partially funded by the European Commission.

800.000 readers in 13 weeks

A little more than three month after the start of the project, it can already be considered as a success story. When we launched lakmusz.hu on the 11th of January, we were hoping to reach 1 million readers over the course of the following 12 months. It turns out the audience was waiting desperately for Hungarian language fact-checking: we reached 100.000 unique users within 7 days and 800.000 unique users 13 weeks into the operation on the website.

We published 93 pieces during our first 3 months. 40 of these were about issues connected to politics and the election campaign, 22 were about disinformation connected to the war, 13 debunked COVID related misinformation while the rest were about media literacy, 5G cellular networks and other issues.

Since the start of our unique project, that sees Magyar Jeti and AFP fact-checkers working together: 

• Magyar Jeti’s fact-checkers have published 71 fact-checks on lakmusz.hu
• AFP has published 12 fact-checks in Hungarian on the common platform. On top of this AFP has published 21 more fact-check articles in Hungarian on its own dedicated website. Clearly, misleading claims related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have dominated the disinformation landscape in Hungary, linke in many other European countries. Hence, AFP has published 14 fact-checks associated with the war and 80% of the new stories that are conducted are Ukraine-related. This trend can be seen worldwide. AFP, which has a global network of more than 120 fact-checkers, has published a staggering number of 723 articles related to the Ukraine conflict since it started in February. 
• Only two fact-checks have dealt since January 11 with the Covid-19 pandemic, while this topic had dominated disinformation claims over the past two years. 

An interesting but challenging trend that we could see in the Hungarian context, but also worldwide, is the rise of what could be called “fact-mocks”, when people publish bogus fact-checks in order to spread misinformation and sow distrust about legitimate journalists producing real fact-checks. Here is one example: https://tenykerdes.afp.com/doc.afp.com.32487W3

Overall, out of all fact-checks published on lakmusz.hu, the 5 most popular pieces of content were:

• How many people turned up at the government / opposition rallies on the 15ht of Marc - 58 thousand readers
• Systemic miscalculation of the attendance of the pro-government Peace-march - 45 thousand readers
• 6 lies in the runup to the Russian invasion - 42 thousand readers
• 5 occasions Zsolt Bayer spread disinformation about the war - 38 thousand views
• What is the real support behind the government’s supermajority in Parliament - 36 thousand readers

Lakmusz began building a healthy following outside the website.

• Facebook - 6 thousand followers
• Instagram - 1.3 thousand followers
• Twitter - 506 followers
• Newsletter - 453 subscribers

While most of the content was in the form of the traditional, text-based article, we began experimenting with new formats from early on.

• We published 19 digital posters created specifically for social media, which showed a simplified, easily accessible and shareable version of some of our fact-checks.
• We organized 3 live broadcasts from our studio, in which one of our reporters spoke to experts about disinformation on the Russian invasion, campaign experts on whether politicians are allowed to lie, and election integrity experts about allegations of irregularities on election day. The talks were live-streamed to Facebook and Youtube and an edited version was uploaded to all major podcast platforms after the live event.
• One of Hungary’s largest NGO, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union created a flyer to be distributed in small, rural communities that is based on media literacy materials we compiled to help people navigate the complex wartime information environment. What to read (and what not to read) if you want to understand what happening in Ukraine (Lakmusz) Digital design of the flyer for small communities (HCLU)

In a media environment captured by the state, disinformation narratives are part of the mainstream

After gaining power in 2010, the government of Viktor Orban began reshaping the Hungarian media environment. The Art of Media War - This is how Viktor Orbán captured the free press in Hungary (by our sister publication 444) details the evolution of this process.

By today, much of the mediaspace is captured with 3 large pro-government entities dominating the legacy environment.

• The state media conglomerate, MTVA is directly funded by the taxpayers, their 2022 budget is 366+ million EUR. They operate multiple broadcast television and radio channels, which are available in the majority of Hungarian households.
• The Central European Press and Media Foundation (CEPMF or “KESMA” in Hungarian) was started in 2018, after most of the government-aligned oligarchs decided, on the very same day, to gift their entire media portfolios to the foundation. CEPMF now owns and controls 450+ media outlets, newspapers, magazines, portals, tv and radio stations. The merger was exempt from regulatory oversight after PM Orban designated it “of strategic national interest” by a decree.
• The TV2 network is a family of broadcast and cable television channels that reach millions of Hungarians.

All three entities are known for their hyperpartisan and often misleading or outright false content. MTVA is funded directly by the state while the outlets of KESMA and the TV2 network receive massive subsidies through state advertising.

A relative newcomer to the pro-government scene, the Megafon Digital Incubator Center mostly operates on social media platforms, which has so far seemed impossible to capture by the government’s “traditional” methods. 

Megafon is recruiting and training social media influencers and journalists, and it is producing pro-government content specifically for social media platforms. They also promote the content they create: in fact, Megafon is the largest spender on Facebook when it comes to political ads. Since the launch of Facebook’s ad transparency library, Megafon was recorded spending more than HUF1.1 billion (EUR 2.94 million) on political ads.

Megafon’s funding is not transparent. They claim to be funded by “private donors” but a recent court ruling determined there is reason to believe they also use public funds.

Since the Russian invasion began on the 24th of February, we saw both the traditional media groups and Megafon used to amplify pro-Kremlin narratives about the war.

Immediate aftermath

• On the 25th of February, the news channel of the state media conglomerate, MTVA interviewed Georg Spöttle, a so-called security expert who spoke at length about the calm professionalism of the Russian troops and compared Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenksyy to Adolf Hitler for trying to arm Ukrainian citizens in the face of the Russian invasion. He also explained how Russian troops occupied the Chernobyl nuclear power station in order to protect it from attack.
• On the 26th of February, Spöttle spoke again on the state news channel,  this time about how Poland was “beating the drums of war” by trying to give Ukraine military aid. According to him, Zelensky and the Ukrainian government should consider resigning to avoid further bloodshed.
• On the 26th of February on HirTv, a 24 hours news channel that is part of the Central European Press and Media Foundation, Otto Gajdics, a popular pro-government media personality explained how we need to look at “what happened in the past 5-6 years in Ukraine, before we blame it [the invasion] all on Putin”. According to Gajdics, the situation is like looking at an injured person on a football field, condemning the other player who violently tackled the injured person, while Gajdics claims he also saw the player now lying on the field, kicking the tackler so many times it lost its patience and good will.
• Between the 28th of February and the 26th of March, Zsolt Bayer, probably the best known pro-government media personality, the host of multiple shows on CEPMF properties, recipient of the Knight’s Cross, one of the highest civilian awards, shared a number of false or misleading posts on his popular blog about the invasion. This included a de-contextualised video from a climate demonstration, disseminated as a proof of staged scenes during the Ukraine war; false information spread by fake CNN accounts, re-posted by Bayer and presented as evidence of the mainstream media’s erroneous reportage; and also a photo falsely claiming of a man covered in nazi tattos that he was the chief police officer or Kiev. 

President Zelenskyy calls out PM Orban

On the 24th of March, while attending a video conference with EU leaders, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenksyy  called out Hungarian PM Viktor Orban over his decision not to let weapons through to Ukraine and blocking sanctions on the Russian energy sector. A day later, the social media arm of the pro-government propaganda machine kicked into gear.

• On the 25th of February, the popular government-aligned FB page “Számok - a baloldali álhírek ellenszere” (Numbers - Antidote for left wing fake news) often shared by government politicians responded with a lengthy post. This claims Zelenskyy is a “dictator” who spent “years killing his own people with tanks”. It says Zelenskyy is holding 150 thousand ethnic Hungarians living in Transcarpathia hostage. “Our message to you: you are going to fail, along with your masters from overseas”
• On the 25th of February, Philip Rákay, a high-profile government media personality and honored guest at high level party meetings, a member of the Megafon-group also posted about Zelenskyy’s remarks on his Facebook. The first sentence reads: “My message to Zelenskyy and the networks: leave my country alone!” The post claims Zelenskyy is part of a network along with Hungarian opposition parties and politicians “and fellow network agents” that are trying to drag Hungary into war. The most liked comment on this post is by a verified account of a Hungarian pop musician Lotfi Begi saying “The US has been playing from this script for decades, they did this in the Middle-East for years, but did not succeed, and they are not going to succeed now.” Rákay responds by claiming the US is trying to destabilize the region, cutting it off from Russian energy in order to be able to sell more LNG to Europe.

Relativization of war crimes

• On the 9th of April, on the CEPMF-owned news channel HirTv, Tamas Lanczi, the digital director of the state media conglomerate MTVA, who held various positions in government and in the pro-government media machine over the past 12 years, explained how the “Russians were engaged in limited warfare in the past month and a half” because they are trying to minimize harm to Ukraine’s civilian population.
• On the 10th of April, on the CEPMF-owned news channel HirTv, Bayer, Gajdics, and Andras Bencsik, another pro-government media personality discussed the Bucha-massacre. Bayer, the host of the primetime show “Press Club” asks his guests if they believed the Russians were responsible for Bucha. Bencsik says he is not sure, and won’t believe international media reports. He alludes to a mysterious international initiative trying to sever Russia from Europe. “One gets this feeling, that it would be really good to find out at some stage, who really attacked whom, and what is the purpose of this war.” Bayer says the atrocities are not in Russia’s interest, and concludes that he believes no one, independent, western media the least, the Ukrainian president and media not at all, and on certain matters, it's hard to believe the Russians as well.

In addition to the government controlled entities, other, grayzone actors are also engaged in spreading disinformation about the war.  The most significant is oroszhirek.hu (“Orosz hírek” translates to Russian News) and its Facebook page, both of which routinely publishes false and misleading information about the war. Despite clearly and repeatedly spreading false narratives, tech companies like Facebook or Google refuse to deplatform the page, but occasionally do remove false content.

Election disinformation

On 3 April 2022, the ruling coalition Fidesz-KDNP won its fourth straight term in the Hungarian general elections, securing a two-third supermajority in the parliament.

Ahead of the election, the main narratives of the campaign - and breeding grounds for mis/disinformation - were expected to be LGBTQ rights and migration. In December, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán referred to these two topics as the most pressing issues of Europe. Politicians of the governing Fidesz party repeatedly used false claims and misleading statistics regarding both issues.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, however, heavily influenced the campaign narrative, and shifted the focus from domestic to geopolitical and security topics, while anti-opposition messages were intertwined with pro-Kremlin and anti-Ukrainian narratives, distributed and emphasized by the vast pro-government media ecosystem.

The messages included:

• Misleading statements about the false binary between peace and war in relation to the opposition;
• Allegations about a secret pact between the Ukrainian president and the Hungarian “Left”, especially after Zelenskiy’s confrontation with Orbán on the 24 March EU summit;
• Open letters to Zelenskiy and “his network”, calling out the president to stop interfering in Hungary’s affairs. 

In the last week before the election (21-27 March), Megafon spent 72 million HUF on advertising, while the pro-government media company, Mediaworks Hungary Ltd. led the race with a 93 million HUF budget. 

Ahead of the election, Lakmusz began a collaboration with Who Targets Me, which aims to create a crowdsourced global database of political adverts placed on social media. Over 1000 Hungarian users downloaded the Who Targets Me browser extension, offering a detailed insight into how political actors targeted users with political ads. Lakmusz is currently collaborating with Civil Liberties Union for Europe and the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union to analyze the data gained and investigate privacy concerns related to the targeting of political ads.

Conclusions

The Hungarian election campaign and the Russian invasion of Ukraine meant that the first quarter of operation was incredibly busy and high stakes. Due to these circumstances, the hard work of the newsroom and our partners, Lakmusz quickly became known for being a reliable source of information about the war and the election campaign and other important issues. We started to explore beyond traditional fact-checking. We are building capacities in media monitoring as part of a joint project with other European fact-checking organizations under the coordination of the German NGO RESET.

For the second quarter our goal is to finalize all internal workflows related to content creation, experiment more with new formats (podcasts, newsletters, potentially live video) and distribution channels, including finding ways to reach audiences in small communities and people who are otherwise not currently part of the core, news consuming audience.

by Blanka Zoldi, editor-in-chief and Peter Erdelyi, director

The Hungarian version of the report is available here.
(The two documents are not identical, as the English version provides more context about the Hungarian media scene.)